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1 Foreword 
What do people feel， see， and speak of legal institutions in their surroundings? 
They say， 1 have a right to …， we can utilize law for a purpose .， 1 bring a 
suit against X for -. According to such usage of expression， rights and duties， 
obligations， and law， court， and so on， look like certain， clear1y existing. These 
existing in our social life wor1d resemble to natural or physical objects such as 
like mountain， houses， desks， chairs， and so on. 1 tentatively cal this way of 
seeing stationary， natural， objective. 
It is so familiar way for our ordinary people that they are accustomed and 
tended to treat such legal institutions as五xed，stable， and unchangeable object. 
According to Professor P. S. Atiyah，“In modern developed societies， law and 
legal institutions are so pervasive， and have in general such stabi1ity， that we 
come to think of many legal (or‘institutional') facts as though they were physi-
cal facts" .1) They are， inthis respect， easily to connect with a trend of status-quo 
value ideas， which in turn may often become somewhat obstructions to institu田
tional change. 
This is the case with lawyers， too. Most lawyers at present know what 
挙 Thispaper is p a r t i a 11yconnected with my paper (in Japanese) entit1ed“An essay 
on legal consciousness"， 30The Sociology of Law， 1984. Originally， it is that paper which 1 pre醐
sented to and upon which 1 made a report at the Symposium on Legal Consiciousness held by 
Japan Association of the Sociology of Law， 1983. 
縁者 Professor of Philosophy of Law， Osaka University， Faculty of Law， L.L. D. University 
of Tokyo， 1968. 
1) P. S. Atiyah， Law and modern society， 50， 1983. 
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socal1ed“rea1istic approach" to the judicial process contributed for us. 80 
far， they are certainly di百'erentin their view of law from ordinarγpeople. N ever-
theless， asAtiyah pointed out， we may perhaps trace in them stil1 now some， but 
considerably strong tendency to look on law as a kind of “entity" . Referring 
to both， ordinary citizens and lawyers， Atiyah impressively characterized these 
way of seeing as way of “rel五cation"，2) which I will return later to consider 
briefly. The problem I would like to confront beforehand is that popular or 
lawyer's way of feeling and seeing of law， a part of which constitutes legal 
consclOusness. 
In this paper， I shal1 at五rstexamine a term legal or social “consciousness" 
in its several implications， then consider its significance in regard to social facts 
and social institutions as often called reified. 
II Image of Legal Consciousness 
What do we image of “legal consiousness"? 
First of al， itmeans that man brings law into clear consciousness and then 
that law lies in the stream of consciousness. The former concerns with an 
active orientation (according to Ed. Husserl noesis)， the latter concerns with the 
oriented， stationary (noema).3) 
Consciou~ness in both aspects is accustomed to be treated and mentioned 
to as located in the i n t e r n a 1 sphere of human being. Certainly， recent 
developments in social or political psychology， cultural anthropology， and so on， 
make it possible for us to do research this phenomena in terms of science， but 
not metaphysics. 
But it does not deny， I think， that there stil now remain several problems 
2) “B凶 althoughmost lawyers would today agree that the law is not a brooding omni-
presence in the sky， there is stil1 a tremendous tempt五tionto reify it and think of it as though 
it were an entity of some kind. To take a simple example， Iawyers would be very loath to 
admit that there might actually be no law on a point. They wou1d readily admit that on such 
and such a point the law is doubtfuI， and that until the courts have decided what it is， 
nobody can say for sure， oradvise his clients what they are likely to decide. But they would 
reject the idea that this somehow means that the law has a gap， a hole. There must be some 
law to cover everything that happens. This is a reflection aIso of the way lawyers tend to think 
of Iaw as something that 'exists'， a tendency powerfuIIy reinforced by the ease with which we 
identiちTphysical objects like printed Acts of ParIi丘ment，or law reports， with the Iaw itself. For 
most ordinary purposes it is quite harmless to think of the Iaw in this sort of wayー indeed，per-
haps it does some good， aswil1 be suggested below. But it can aIso Iead to confusion for the 
person who seeks a deeper understanding of the nature of lawぺ 1)52. 
3) 1 think 1 need not make a much citation due to a familiarity of the topic of this kind. 
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concerned with how and to what extent an e x t e r n a 1 observercan grasp， ，
understand， and clariちTthat i n t e r n a 1 aspects of legal consciousness held by 
others. 
It is a popular and customary way for us to say that we sincerely take other's 
idea into conside1'ation， or in accordance with othe1"s intention， 01' we do 
1'espect .. It gives us an impression of mutual unde1'standing very easy. 
Othe1's， howeve1'， have their each own ego (alte1'岨ego)，as wel1 as I have ego. 
As far as such a problem is concerned， what does it mean to look in at the window 
of other mind? A possible way at most is that as I feel and think in such and such 
a way， probably othe1's also wi1l do in the same way， that is， a way of analogy， 
guess， presumption， ce1'tainty of which is not always high and clear. A scep陶
ticism or pecimism of this sort， asfar as it is sound， may well to serve as a warn-
ing to optimistic believers in scienti五cinvestigation.4) 
HI Why do We study Legal Consciousness ? 
There are at least two possible ways to use this word - narrow and wide. 
Legal consciousness in a narrower sense is directed to the modern formal law 
of state which is artificial1y made by the state authorities， and if necessary， ready 
to impose sanction against its violation. Legal consciousness in a wider sense， 
on the contrary， isdirected not only to the state law， but a wider range of 
standards or principles of social action， which se1've as a kind of guidance for 
members of various social groups， and simultaneously control them， such as 
like“living law" as pointed out by E. Ehr1ich， 01' "ausserstaatliches Recht“by 
hιWeber.5) 
It is clear in this connection that di百erentusages of a word legal consciousness 
partly depend on such di妊erentusages of a word law. Although I also pay 
attention to this di荘'erence，I shall use hereafter a word legal consciousness both 
in a wider and narrower sense according to the purpose of examination.' But， 
it must be remembered he1'e that a narrower sense of legal consciousness is to 
some extent similar to law as a pa1't of second layer of institution， while a wider 
sense equivalent to五rstlayer ofinstitution as I state later. I only mention to 
1 only mention to a few names: Ed. Husserl， W. James， A Schutz (Schutz) .. 
4) An interesting discussion can be seen in: A. Schutz and T. Parsons， The theory of 
social action -The correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Talcott Prsons， ed. by R. Grathoff， 
1978. 
5) E. Ehrlich， Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts， 1913. M. Weber， Rechtssoziologie， 
herausg. und eingeleitet won J. Winckelmann， 1960. 
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“right consciousness"6) being often used and spoken of in. a similar context. 
Another point 1 would like to cal attention to is that al members of social 
groups， stillless society， not always have legal consciousness day by day. Some-
times， some day， some of them may become absentminded， or behave merely 
along their habitual way， and indeed， alof them do sleep. Therefore， 1 use a 
word legal consciousness here in a losse connotation. 
Then， toguess from the usage above， itappears not di伍cultfor us to un-
derstand why we are interested in the topic of leagal cohsciousness and what 
is a purpose of its study. 
IV How to use a Word Legal Consciousness ? 
We have a kind of tradition of research in legal consciousness in J apan. The 
purpose of this research is mainly practical， and it originally started with五eld
survey. For instance， itwas done for the purpose of effective realization， or 
enforcement of law relating to economic regulation during the Second W or1d 
War period， and also done on the ground of acute demand of rapid and yet 
adequate enforcement of a series of postwar legislation of socalled democratiza-
tion and demilitar包ation. It is easy to understand that the latter was urgent 
only if we remember the strong social bond lying at that time within rural com咽
munities， mountain villages， and五shermens'，al located at country-side. It 
is the social bond of this type which came to be certain barriers against democra-
tization and its law， and which had been a real basis of members of rural com-
munities， and so on， intheir social conduct and judgement， tospeak五gurativelly，
“living law" in social settings. 
Situation since 1960 has raised so impressively big problems for the present 
formal law to adapt new demands brought from varieties of五elds，such as like 
medical treatment， environment， social welfare， and so on， that it come also 
urgent to do research on a popular consciousness in connection with formally 
valid law and their real demand. 
By these experiences we have at first to be faced with a kind of question why 
not modern Western law imported was getting to be effective within J apanese， 
6) This topic was also much discussed in the Symposium 1). Clasical study was done 
by T. Kawashima during the post圃warperiod. Cf. Kawashima， Dispute resolution in coト
temporaηJapan， in: A. von Mehren(edふLawin Japan， 1963. It may be worth noticing that 
recent controversy about Japanese right consciousness or legal consicousness in the process of 
modernization of J apan a part of which 1 mentioned at II in this paper has been partlv made 
about propriety of the isue raised by Kawashim's pioneerwork. 
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why are not such legal consciousness， orright consciousness dominant， inother 
words， why traditional1y followed established standards， living law， stil1 now 
so powerful to modify or reduce a significant role of the Western supposed to 
play in modernization of J apan. And then， a further question how at present 
we are properly to treat with triplet of the Western styled Japanese law (con幽
sciousness)， the traditional standard of action-judgement， and newly raised 
demand by ordinary people for responsive law， orby decision-maker for policy-
oriented law.7) 
V Strati五cationof Legal Consciousness in Time， 
Space， and Actors 
When we say that individuals have their own legal consciousness， several 
stages wi1l be presupposed. The五rststage is that they bring law into their 
consciousness and are conscious of it - dynamic， subjective in a sense stated 
above -， and the second that law， once having been conscious， iscoming to 
anchor in consciousness， then lying there， or deposited at its bottom to become 
a part of subconsciousness - stationary， static， objective as stated above -， and 
the third that law again comes up to the surface of consciousness like a leaf or 
a piece of branch to the surface of stream of a river， and the fourth that legal con-
sciousness as such supports and is supported by external social action， orlegal 
action of the same individual. 
Legal consciousness in a narrower sense may be only connected with the 
former three stages. But， viewed from social perspective， itis much more 
convenient and meaningful to understand legal consciousness in terms of a loose 
set or connection of internal three stage.s and external factual action， the latter 
fourth. lndeed， itwill be real1y significant when we are to deal with problems 
of institution like law. For this purpose we shall tentatively classify several 
varieties of legal consciousness by using three di宣erentscales of time， space， and 
subject related to it， oractor. A legal consciousness， timely， has been established 
7) On this problem， cf.P. Nonet and P. Selznick， Law and society in transition， 1987. 
G. Teubner， substantive and reflexive elements in modern law， 17Law & Society Review， 1983. 
H. Rottleutner， Theorien der Rechtsentwicklung zwischen Empirie und Geschichtsphilosophie， 
11 IVR Wor1d Congress paper， 1983. Casba Varga， Macrosociological theories of law， 11 
IVR Wor1d Congresspaper， 1983. R. M. Unger， The critical legal studies movement， 96 
Harvard L. Rev.， 1983. W. H. Clune II， A political model of implementation and implica-
tions of the model for public policy， research， and the changirig roles of law and lawyers， 69 
Iowa L. Rev.， 1983. M. Yasaki， Model-change or role幽changeof law in the end of this century 
(Hふmoderu，Ho・kino，ronto seikimatsu)， Shiso， Sept.， 1982. 
6 OSAKA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [No. 31 
and becomes dominant for a long period， and seeing from space， within this J apanese 
society， or in England， and from subject， supposed to be held by most people 
or ordinary actors. Then a question wil1 be raised here is to what extent such 
a type of legal consciousnes， though looking like stationary and static， isable 
to have a potential force within people or acto1's. 
A-(l) One is a case in which sterotyped ce1'tain legal consciousness ap岨
pears gene1'ally appealing and powerful， and actually it is so. 
A-(2) Another is a case in which different types of legal consciousness 
compete so much each other to press us consciousness in splitness or pluralism 
there， 1'esulting f1'om， or 1'elated to struggle， opposition， and competiton between 
c1ass喧consciousnessesin our contemporary society. 
B Furthe1'more， the1'e isa chance for new type of legal consciousness， time1y， 
coming to be apparent only now， and viewed from space perspective， from within 
that interest group， 01' this intellectual circIe， and f1'om subject， starting with a 
movement of tiny g1'ass-roots group. It may well be called 1'ather fiexible and 
dynamic than static. 
Though powerless at p1'esent， iteventual1y may reach to the top-level of social 
public morality due to its stimulating feature of self-presentation which is apt 
to attract general interest by means of destructing olde1' t1'adition， or taming it 
to othe1' seemingly possible directions. 
C 1ndividual 1 made a simple ilust1'ation in 1'egard to social group level， 
either la1'ge， 01' small. But， what constitutes each social groups is nothing but 
an individual. 1t is an individual who has been emphasized as a subject of 1'ight 
within a framewo1'k of modern Western law. An individual is really a unit of 
g1'eat impo1'tance. What is 1'emarkable here， however， isthe fact that the1'e is
a loose， but insepa1'able 1'elationships of individuals to social groups， where they 
Iive 01' to which they always 1'efe1'. This is not only the 1'elationship in medieval 
society，8) but even in modern society we can五nda simila1' though different sト
tuation， and yet it is much c1early apparent in our society at present. 
C-(l) Generally speaking， individual is tended to be seen and spoken of 
as subject of legal consciousness to be described， for instance， ina way of “Ja-
panese-like'うor“Americanway". This indicates a de五niteview or image exist-
ing to speak of each as Japanese in gene1'al 01' American as a whole. It in-
dicates simultaneously t 
8) It is beter for understanding general feling in community to recal our mind on John 
Donne's famous verse “For whom the bel1 tol1s?"， a meaning of which 1 learned from Prof. 
Atiyah during his stay in Japan in last September， 1983. 
1984] SIGNIFICANCE OF “LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS" IN REGARD 
TO SOCIAL FACTS AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
7 
minant in J apan. C-(l) is in this sense another side of Aー (1). As far as we pay 
attention to history in a very shorter period by hypothetically stopping so 
rapidly changing huge stream of history， and as far as we give an emphasis on 
one country like Japan by contrast to others， it is not di伍cu1tand unreasonable 
for us to speak of and imagine one stable， internally well integrated， period， 
society， and legal consciousness therein. 
C-(2) Even in such a period， society， however， each individuals according 
to the social strati:fication are able to have， and indeed have had their own uni-
que， therefore each di旺erent，sometimes conflicting legal consciousnesses， and it 
is much more possible and actual in such a period， society， when and where new 
energy of a group of individuals take a form of new social value against older 
traditional (istic) values to lead to a social change. 
In addition， other factor making the matter complicated is a speciality in J apan. 
She is located in the East Asia. She has been developed under the very strong 
influences of the Buddhist， Confuzianist， and Christian religion and cu1tural 
tradition of this sort.9) 
It is no wonder for us to refer to J apanese legal consciousness i n g e n e r a 1 so
far as we are in J apan. But， reality of the matter is not so simple as we imagined 
from the五rstimpression. From a part of the complex matter 1 wrote above 
follow further problems of implication. 
For instance， away of expression of Japanese legal consciousness in generalー }
A-(l)， C-(l)-. It implies that Japanese are general1y accustomed to see and 
to be conscious of law in such and such a way， tosum up， iti sノthefact that 
they see and are conscious of …. We may tentativelly cal this“is" level legal 
consclOusness. 
We must take a notice on the process of mixing up in which “ought" level 
legal consciousness .such as like “law ought to be such and such"， or“there ought 
to be such and such law" sometimes makes an opposition to， or sometimes in-
terwoven into “is" levellegal consciousness， tolead to be harmoniously blended. 
Of course there is another type of mixing-up process in which an actor (or 
actors) speaks of a clearly cognitive legal consciousness being objectively in 
existence by secretly changing or replacing his or her (their) own subjective con-
viction， wish， desire for it， that is， subjective ought-level legal consciousness for 
objective is-level. It will be done either negligently or intentional1y， purposivelly. 
This negligent or intentional way of dealing with the matter， however， isnot 
9) Cf. Yasaki， Legal culture - past and present (Hδbunka-dentδto genzai)， Shisδ，Nov.， 
1983. 
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hypothetical， but really possible， and yet often can be seen in the various五elds
of value consciousness， norm consciousness， social consciousness， and legal 
consclOusness. 
To pick up not unusual examples， there may be cases like political use of the 
present situation (statistics) of social consciousness， or purposive use of socalled 
“common morality"，“public morality" (in J apanese“shakai-tsunen") by judge， 
public prosecuting attorney， twelve men and women in jury box in the court， or
some similar use by officials and politician. Such a series of examples indicate 
us a latent， but considerably high degree of danger existing in our life-world 
that value consciousness， ideology of a p a r t i a 1 socilgroup tend sometimes 
to be secret1y and intentionally changed for social consciousness i n g e n e r a 1 
at that time. By the way， legal consciousness apt to differently reread， 
understood， changed， and manipulated in this way， so to speak， must be 
a miniature copy of our comtemporary society， state in a gradual or rapid 
change. 
VI Legal Consciousness and Rei五cation
And then? The consideration above again brings us to the starting point， 
that is， a problem of reification. Actors communicating with each other are 
necessarily connected with both social facts and institutions. “Connected" 
means both to be influenced and controlled by social facts and institutions and 
to utilize them as guidance and means for actors. For the purpose of actors 
these appear as a convenient and reliable tool for their ordinary life， and as to 
their in丑uencingand control1ing role these appear as objects being unable to 
disregard and forced to follow from the popular point of view on the one hand， 
and as objects useful to justify their use of power from 0自cialpoint of view on 
the other. Anyway， according to general or 0伍cialfeeling， image， consciousness， 
social facts and institutions are mirrored as if these had real existence， and in 
this sense， as stated above， are “rel五ed".10) 
But， what we have to pay attention is a relation of such feeling， consciousness 
with them. Social facts and institutions themselves， on the other hand， are 
direct1y or indirect1y a kind of arti五cialproducts of actors with feeling， coト
10) Cf. G. Lukacs， Die Verding1ichung und das Bewusstsein des Proletariats， in:Geschichte 
und Klassenbewusstsein， Luchterhand， 1968. This is a kind of clasics. But， inthis paper 
I merely deal with “reification" as a word to describe the popular or oficial way of seeing institu-
tions including law -according to my idea， through screen of "as if"， orf i c t i 0n-.
9 
sciousness， and are spoken of as if rei五ed. 1 shall add a few words as a tentative 
conclusion， by referring to a map-l as shown in page. 
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1. Social facts certainly imply a very wide range of matters in our life-world. 
But， basically these concern with the fact that we are living together whether we 
like it or not. It follows from this fact that we communicate with each other 
through language， exchange idea， goods， and so on. A relationship between a 
man and a woman， and a practice of exchange of goods with symbolic equivalents 
of values like beautiful stone， shell， gold are also connected with the facts above. 
We can perhaps illustrate these social facts by changing time， space， and subjects 
like primitive society v. contemporary society and actors therein.Hl For this 
purpose it may be convenient for us to cite di百'erentscales， A-l， A-2， B， C-l， 
C-2， stated above. 
Social facts are interwoven with our customary or social practice12l on the other 
11) 9) 
12) cf. H. L. A. Hart， The concept of Law; 1961， R.Dworkin， Taking right seriously， 
2nd imp.， 1978. 
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hand， in which we五ndagain we live， act， judge， and evaluate according to a 
nexus of internal consciousness and external action. Viewed from this pers-
pective， social facts， atleast in a sense of A-l， C-l， appear certain， stable， and 
really existing on the ground of general consensus or popular consciousness. 
In this respect social facts， we may say， are rei五ed，and constitute a五rstlayer 
of institution， in other words， institutional facts as to be mentioned soon after. 
2. Institution， however， has different meaning from the五rstlayer of institu-
tion. It rather often indicates social arrangements of a more complicated， 
arti五ciallyelaborated type from religious sects， social clubs through schools， la-
bor unions， corporations to law， society， and state as a whole. We tentatively 
cal them a second layer of institution.13) As stated above， these institutions， 
certainly including law， look like certain， reliable， stable， useful， objectively 
existing on the one hand， and controlling， repressive on the other， and accordingly 
rel五ed.
3. A relation between social facts and institutions， too， must be carefully ex-
amined. It is sure that social facts supply very important materials to social 
institutions. But it is institutions (second layer) which give naked facts social 
meaning. That is why I called above五rstlayer of institution institutional (se-
cond) facts. 
The fact someone ki1ed another is surely important and relevant fact to law， 
but it is the penal law provision which deals with the fact as legal or legally 
relevant fact. 80 far， facts andinstitutions are intimately connected with each 
other like feedback relation. It may be， however， much more proper expression， 
if we cal this relation a “spiral" from the following reason. 
4. 80cial facts and institutions are both always directly or indirect1y have 
been formed， ascertained， established， developed， and modified by actors though 
their consciousness. While they see generally in facts and institutions certain 
13) 1 used tentatively technical terms like first layer or second layer of institution. Sources 
of such technical terms， asit well known， aremany， forexample， Kulturnorm und Rechtsnorm， 
Handlungsnorm und Entscheidungsnorm， primary ruJes of obligation and secondary rules.. 
A way of expression in this paper is rather close to Atiyah's， though considerably modified. For 
instance， heputs it as fol1ows: "Many of us think we have 'money in the bank'. But that isn't 
a physical fact at al. Strictly speaking， ashas been well said， the only person who has money 
in a bank is the bank itself. What the customer has is a legal right to obtain money from his 
bank in various ways， and subject to various limitations. Many ordinaIγwords in everyday 
use (for instance， 'wife' or‘husband') can only be fuly understood by reference to a complex 
and interwoven network of law and regulation. In some societies the word 'wife' or its equivalent， 
for instance， might just mean 'the woman 1 live with'. But in a developed society it does not 
mean that: your wife remains your wife even if you don't live with her， and the woman you live 
with doesn't， by that fact alone， become your wife". 1) 51. 
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rel五edexistences， atthe same time they see fact sometimes from each di宜erent
points of view， and interpret institution like law di古'erently. Perhaps we are 
better to use scale B， or C-2 for this occasion， and a very familiar example may 
be a judicial process. Professor R. M. Unger illuminatingly puts it as follows: 
“Can judges make use of a method that purges their decisions of personal 
whim? If we admit that words lack self-evident reference， that meaning must 
ultimately be determined by purpose and context， and that the intent of prior 
lawmakers is always more or less incomplete， itbecomes doubtful whether a truly 
impartial method of judging could ever be fashioned within the conditions of 
liberal society. The sense of the precariousness and of the illegitimacy of 
consensus makes it di伍cultfor the judge to find a stable authoritative set of shared 
understandings and values upon which to base his interpretations of the law. 
Hence， every case forces him to decide， atleast implicitly， which of the competing 
sets of belief in a given society should be given priority. And it requires him 
to rely on an accepted morality that， even if it can be identi五edis increasingly 
revealed as the product of a social situation itself lacking in sanctity. To this 
extent， adjudication aggravates， rather than resolves， the problem of unjustifiable 
power" .14) 
N ot only judges， but public 0伍cials，even legislators， more or less， have to 
be faced with similar problems. Furthermore， within a五eIdof law interpreta-
tion and application lawyers， prosecuting attorneys， parties， and ordinary people 
are also involved according to their each own different， though interrelated， senses 
of justice. 
5. The judicial process as just mentioned above is only a facet of the present 
age where we are thrown into a heavy stream of value splitness or moral pluralism. 
The mood of our age is tended to spread. It covers not only private world of 
human life， but public sphere， and brings us rather a world with fresh im-
pression by mixing up with each other. 80 far， the matters under such a mood 
appears subjective，丑exible，and丑owinglike A-2， B.C-2. Once any of various 
value ideas after severe五ghtbetween them to be described "Gotterkampf“ 
(M. Weber) has occupied the premier position， itcomes to be stable， certain， 
dominant， and objective like A-l， C-l， thus reified， and spreading over social 
facts and institutions. 
Referring to map-2， itis understan 
14) R. M. Unger， Law in modern society， 180乙1976.
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layer of institution surely including law， 3)a third layer of institution …・ This
way of reading map-2 may be c a u s a 1 because it proceeds from cause or 
origin to effect. If so， we may reread the map from an opposite side， tosum 
up， from the third institution through the second to the五rst. F or this purpose 
1 use an arrow sign in the map-2. This way may well be called f u n c-
t 1 0 n 1 n g. 
1 use an arrow sign 可 inthe map-2. This way may well be caUed f u n c-
t 1 0 nl n g. 
[Map-2] 
institution-law 
Though there is third way of reading map which probably makes it possible 
for us to understand a highly complicated interrelatedness between them， 1 
must be content in this paper merely by pointing out an interesting (spirah> de四
velopment， despite of五rstimpression of feedback relation， taken place between 
actors， consciousness， act， fact， institution， and rei五cation. 1 also have to leave 
it ti1l next time to e玄aminemodel change or role change of law in a light of 
reflexion which has been said since 1960.15) 
15) Partly 1 treated this problem in my paper 7). 
